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ABSTRACT
Objectives The UK’s Quality and Outcomes
Framework permits practices to exempt patients
from financially-incentivised performance targets.
To better understand the determinants and
consequences of being exempted from the
framework, we investigated the associations
between exception reporting, patient
characteristics and mortality. We also quantified
the proportion of exempted patients that met
quality targets for a tracer condition (diabetes).
Design Retrospective longitudinal study, using
individual patient data from the Clinical Practice
Research Datalink.
Setting 644 general practices, 2006/7 to
2011/12.
Participants Patients registered with study
practices for at least one year over the study
period, with at least one condition of interest
(2 460 341 in total).
Main outcome measures Exception reporting
rates by reason (clinical contraindication, patient
dissent); all-cause mortality in year following
exemption. Analyses with logistic and Cox
proportional-hazards regressions, respectively.
Results The odds of being exempted increased
with age, deprivation and multimorbidity. Men
were more likely to be exempted but this was
largely attributable to higher prevalence of
conditions with high exemption rates. Modest
associations remained, with women more likely to
be exempted due to clinical contraindication (OR
0.90, 99% CI 0.88 to 0.92) and men more likely
to be exempted due to informed dissent (OR
1.08, 99% CI 1.06 to 1.10). More deprived areas
(both for practice location and patient residence)
were non-linearly associated with higher
exception rates, after controlling for comorbidities
and other covariates, with stronger associations
for clinical contraindication. Compared with
patients with a single condition, odds ratios for
patients with two, three, or four or more
conditions were respectively 4.28 (99% CI 4.18 to
4.38), 16.32 (99% CI 15.82 to 16.83) and 68.69
(99% CI 66.12 to 71.37) for contraindication, and
2.68 (99% CI 2.63 to 2.74), 4.02 (99% CI 3.91
to 4.13) and 5.17 (99% CI 5.00 to 5.35) for
informed dissent. Exempted patients had a higher
adjusted risk of death in the following year than
non-exempted patients, regardless of whether
this exemption was for contraindication (hazard
ratio 1.37, 99% CI 1.33 to 1.40) or for informed
dissent (1.20, 99% CI 1.17 to 1.24). On average,
quality standards were met for 48% of exempted
patients in the diabetes domain, but there was
wide variation across indicators (ranging from
8 to 80%).
Conclusions Older, multimorbid and more
deprived patients are more likely to be exempted
from the scheme. Exception reported patients are
more likely to die in the following year, whether
they are exempted by the practice for a
contraindication or by themselves through
informed dissent. Further research is needed to
understand the relationship between exception
reporting and patient outcomes.
INTRODUCTION
Pay-for-performance programmes aim to
improve patient care by providing finan-
cial incentives to providers for meeting
quality targets. Major national schemes
have been introduced in several countries
over the past decade, including the
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Quality and Outcomes Framework (QOF) in the UK,1
the Hospital Value-Based Purchasing Program2 and
the Medicare Physician Quality Reporting System3 in
the USA, and the Practice Incentives Program in
Australia.4 Schemes implemented to date have had
mixed success in improving processes of care5–7 and
there is conflicting evidence for their impact on
patient outcomes.8–13 Optimal programme designs
remain elusive. One of the main challenges is to
ensure that targets applied to whole populations are
appropriate for individual patients, so that patient
autonomy is respected and unnecessary investigations
and treatments are avoided for those who will not
benefit.
The UK’s QOF programme provides incentives to
family practices for meeting a wide range of clinical,
organisational and patient experience targets.1 Data
on performance are extracted from practices’ clinical
computing systems and are collated in a national data-
base (QMAS) and assessed at the end of each financial
year. The scheme includes provisions for practices to
exempt (or ‘exception report’) patients they deem
inappropriate from single, multiple or all incentivised
targets (box 1). Patients who refuse investigations and
treatments can also be exempted, provided that the
practice has discussed the reasons directly with the
patient. Practices are not financially penalised if they
miss quality targets for exempted patients, since these
patients are not included in the annual calculation of
quality achievement. The most common reasons for
exception reporting are logistical (recent registration
or diagnosis—41%), followed by informed dissent
(30%) and clinical contraindication or unsuitability
(26%).14
If used appropriately, exception reporting is a
potentially effective tool for introducing some flexibil-
ity into national indicator sets. It allows doctors to
exercise clinical judgement in the pursuit of quality
targets and to tailor care according to individual cir-
cumstances. However, inappropriate use of exception
reporting can undermine pay-for-performance pro-
grammes, potentially enabling practices to claim large
financial rewards without providing the recommended
level of care.15 16 Initially, practices exempted rela-
tively few patients (median 5.3%, IQR 4.0%–6.9% in
2005/2006),17 but exemption rates have increased as
quality targets have been made more challenging,18 19
which might reflect more accurate recording of
genuine exemptions or gaming to maximise
income.16 20
Studies of exception reporting have been limited in
two respects.15 17 First, the levels of exception report-
ing are routinely reported at the practice level, and it
is therefore not possible to examine the relationships
between exception reporting, patient characteristics
(such as age, sex and multimorbidity) and outcomes.
Previous investigations have found that overall rates of
exceptions under the QOF have been low, but there is
wide variation between quality indicators (ranging
from zero to 24%) and between practices.14 This has
raised concerns that particular groups of patients—for
example, those living in more deprived areas, with
particular conditions, or with multimorbidity—are
more likely to be exception reported and, as a result,
may have poorer health outcomes. Understanding
these issues requires patient-level analysis. To date,
patient-level analyses have been restricted to local
areas and specific conditions, and have found that
patients living in deprived areas, from ethnic minor-
ities and with multimorbidity are more likely to be
exception reported and are subsequently less likely to
achieve treatment goals.21
Second, if a patient who has been exception
reported subsequently meets the target (eg, if they ini-
tially refuse to have their blood pressure measured but
later attend for monitoring or have blood pressure
measured as part of other care) the exception report is
overridden. Although a record of the original excep-
tion report remains on the practice’s clinical comput-
ing system, the patient is not counted as an exception
on the national QMAS database. This creates two
classes of exempted patients: (1) those for whom the
quality standards were not met, the numbers of which
can be derived and are routinely reported on the
QMAS database22 and (2) those for whom the stan-
dards were met, the numbers of which cannot be
derived from national data. Thus, the total percentage
of patients who receive an exception code is higher
than the nationally reported rate, which does not
include patients for whom the exception report was
subsequently overridden. However, the levels of both
types of exemption are informative. For example, a
high ratio of ‘met’ to ‘unmet’ clinical contraindication
exemptions might suggest that the exception reporting
provision is being applied too liberally in the first
instance. For informed dissent, a high rate of ‘met’
exception reports might reflect dissenting patients
reconsidering their original decision, either autono-
mously or under pressure from practices.
In this study, we used individual patient-level data
to investigate: (1) patterns of exception reporting; (2)
patient and practice predictors of exception reporting;
(3) the associations between different types of excep-
tion reporting and mortality and (4) rates of both
‘met’ and ‘unmet’ exceptions for patients with a tracer
condition (diabetes).
METHODS
Guidance for exception reporting is produced annu-
ally by NHE Employers,23 and details of the record-
ing of exceptions by practices have been previously
described.14 Exemptions are applied on an individual-
patient basis using one of nine permitted reasons
(box 1). However, practice clinical computing systems
use a limited set of exception codes, and some reasons
are conflated in the electronic patient record. For the
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purposes of this study, exception reports were cate-
gorised under broad categories as: (1) logistical; (2)
clinical contraindication or unsuitability; (3) informed
dissent and (4) unknown reason. The latter group
consists of patients who have been exempted from
whole clinical domains, where the specific reason is
not recorded. We did not examine logistical exemp-
tions in our analyses, as these mainly relate to patients
registered or diagnosed towards the end of each year.
Data sources
We extracted data from the Clinical Practice Research
Datalink (CPRD), a database of individual patient
records drawn from family practices in the UK using
the Vision clinical computer system (used in approxi-
mately a fifth of all practices24). Available data include
patient diagnoses, management and deaths. In July
2012, data were available for 645 practices and
13 772 992 patients. Data were linked to Office of
National Statistics (ONS) data, allowing measurement
of area deprivation (using the Index of Deprivation25)
at the practice location. More detailed information on
area deprivation measured at the patient’s location26
and on deaths verified by ONS were only available for
a subgroup of 357 practices that had agreed to the
additional linkages (covering approximately 60% of
patients).
Study design: retrospective cohort
There was a major revision of the QOF scheme in
2006, therefore to ensure consistency in our longitu-
dinal analyses we limited the study period to years 3–
8 of the scheme (1 April 2006 to 31 March 2012).
Practice performance on the QOF is measured across
financial years and we divided the study period into
six financial years (1 April to 31 March the following
year). Within each year, we identified practices that
reliably contributed data for the whole year.27 Within
each practice and study year, we selected patients
registered with the practice for the full year and from
these we identified patients with at least one condition
of interest, at any point in time up to the end of the
respective year.
Conditions of interest were those incentivised in the
QOF from 2006 onwards: atrial fibrillation, asthma,
hypertension, cancer, coronary heart disease, heart
failure, chronic kidney disease, chronic obstructive
pulmonary disease, dementia, depression, diabetes,
epilepsy, learning disability, severe mental health,
stroke and hypothyroidism. We excluded clinical
domains that were not a condition (eg, palliative care),
were concerned only with maintenance of a register
(eg, obesity) or that were introduced in later years (eg,
osteoporosis). All codes used in the study are available
at http://www.clinicalcodes.org.28
Datasets
Using R V.3.1.1,29 we generated three datasets with
which we aimed to answer our main research ques-
tions. Dataset #1 included yearly aggregated excep-
tion reporting information for patients with at least
one of the conditions of interest. Dataset #2 con-
tained all recorded exception information for patients
in dataset #1: Read exception code, type of excep-
tion, exception date and QOF indicators to which the
exception applied. Dataset #3 focused on patients
with diabetes aged 18 or over: diabetes diagnosis date,
information on eligibility, achievement and exceptions
for 15 clinical indicators that were included in the
QOF diabetes domain for most or all of the study
period. Full details are provided in the online supple-
mentary appendix.
Analyses
Analyses were undertaken in Stata V.13.1, and an α
level of 1% was used throughout.30 However, statis-
tical significance is not very informative in analyses of
datasets of this size and we focus on the clinical sig-
nificance of the effect sizes rather than p values.31
Box 1 Permissible reasons for exception reporting
patients
Logistical
▸ The patient is newly diagnosed or recently registered
with the practice*
▸ The investigative or secondary care service is unavail-
able to the practice
Clinical contraindication or unsuitability
▸ The patient has an allergy, another contraindication
or has experienced an adverse reaction to the speci-
fied medication
▸ The patient has not tolerated medication
▸ The patient is on the maximum tolerated dose of
medication, but levels remain suboptimal
▸ The patient has a supervening condition that makes
treatment clinically inappropriate
▸ The patient is not appropriate due to particular cir-
cumstances, for example terminal illness or extreme
frailty†
Informed dissent
▸ The patient refuses to attend†
▸ The patient does not agree to investigation or
treatment‡
*Within 3 months in the case of measurement indicators
(eg, measurement of blood pressure) and 9 months
in the case of treatment and outcomes indicators
(eg, control of blood pressure within target levels).
The patient is excluded from all relevant indicators.
†Patient is excluded for the whole clinical domain (eg,
all diabetes indicators).
‡Patient is excluded for this activity across all clinical
domains (eg, measurement of blood pressure).
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Using dataset #1, we descriptively examined the
characteristics of patients who are exception reported
and used regression modelling of practices with linked
ONS data to investigate predictors of exception
reporting and examined whether exemption is asso-
ciated with mortality. Longitudinal random-effects
logistic regression models were used to assess the
effect of year, gender, age, the presence of each of the
16 conditions of interest (as binary variables), practice
list size, region and deprivation on the presence of at
least one relevant exception code. Alternative models
included the number of relevant conditions (one, two,
three, four or more) as predictors, in place of the indi-
vidual conditions.
Proportional-hazards survival models with yearly
time-windows were used to examine the associations
between patient mortality and age, gender, smoking
status (current, ex, never smoked, missing), area
deprivation at the patient’s location, each of the 16
conditions of interest, practice list size, area depriv-
ation at the practice location and exception reports.
Recorded information in each year was used to model
survival or death in the subsequent year; that is, 2007/
2008 deaths were predicted using 2006/2007 data,
etc, up until 2011/2012 deaths predicted by 2010/
2011 data. We introduced time-varying covariates,
when needed, to ensure the proportional-hazard
assumption stood. The relationship between exception
reporting and mortality was investigated in two separ-
ate survival models. In the first, types of exception
reporting (clinical contraindication, informed dissent
and reason unknown) were included as separate pre-
dictors. In the second, all three reasons were aggre-
gated into a single predictor. As sensitivity analyses,
we calculated propensity scores (for all reasons,
contraindication and informed dissent) as an alterna-
tive means of controlling for the role of the covariates
on the probability of being exception reported.
We used dataset #2 to investigate the frequency of
all relevant exception codes used over time. We aggre-
gated the data at the practice level to calculate the
number of exception codes per 1000 patients in each
practice. Dataset #3 was used to descriptively provide
insight on exception reported patients for which the
relevant quality indicator (or indicators) was met, for
all indicators in the diabetes domain and each finan-
cial year. Due to the complexity of fully mapping a
QOF clinical domain in a primary care database, we
were only able to perform this analysis for one condi-
tion. We selected diabetes as it has high prevalence
and the greatest range of QOF indicators.
RESULTS
Between 2006/2007 and 2011/2012, 644 of the 645
CPRD practices were active, and a total of 2 460 341
patients were identified with at least one of the 16
conditions of interest (the respective figures for the
ONS linked data were 1 470 461 patients and 357
practices). In 2006/2007, 569 practices were active
(ie, provided data) with a total registered population
of 5 321 351 patients, of which 1 602 366 patients
(30.1%) had at least one of the examined QOF condi-
tions. In 2011/2012, 499 practices were active with a
total population of 5 069 748 patients, of whom
1 486 578 (29.3%) had at least one of the conditions.
Exemption rates over time are provided in table 1.
Additional information on the characteristics of non-
exempted and exempted patients, by exception
reporting category, is provided in online supplemen-
tary appendix table A1. Prevalence rates for the mod-
elled conditions are provided in online supplementary
appendix table A2. The percentage of patients with an
examined condition who had at least one exception
reporting code remained relatively stable over the
study period at 18.8%–19.9%. In 2011/2012, 12.4%
of patients received at least one clinical contraindica-
tion code and 9.0% received an informed dissent
code (figure 1). In 2011/2012, exception reporting
rates for any reason (excluding logistical exceptions)
ranged from 17.1% in South-Central England to
25.5% in Scotland. Rates increased with increasing
area deprivation, both for practice location (18.1% in
the least deprived quintile in 2011/2012 and 21.4%
in the most deprived) and patient location (17.3%
and 19.8%, respectively). On average, exempted
patients were older than non-exempted patients
(mean age 61.6 and 54.5, respectively, in 2011/2012)
and men were exception reported more often than
women (21.2% compared with 18.8%). Patients who
died were more likely to have been exception reported
in the previous year (41.4% for 2010/2011) than
those who remained alive (19.5%). Percentages of
patients receiving at least one exception code varied
across conditions from 16.5% (in 2011/2012) for
depression and learning disability to 46.2% for heart
failure.
The most commonly reported specific reason for
exception reporting was ‘influenza vaccination
declined’, making up approximately 15% of all non-
logistical exceptions within a year (see online supple-
mentary appendix table A4). Other common reasons
were ‘asthma resolved’ (5.4%), ‘informed dissent for
asthma indicators’ (4.2%) and ‘depression resolved’
(3.5%).
Predictors of exception reporting
Use of exception reporting increased over time, espe-
cially for informed dissent (table 2). In our regression
models, the odds of being exception reported
increased with age. Men were more likely to be
exempted than women for informed dissent
(OR=1.08, 99% CI 1.06 to 1.10), but less likely for
contraindications (OR=0.90, 99% CI 0.88 to 0.92).
The odds of being exempted varied across clinical
domains, at least partly reflecting opportunities to be
exempted (odds of exception reporting for any reason
Original research
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Table 1 Rates of exception reporting and characteristics of included patients, 2006/2007 to 2011/2012
2006/2007 2007/2008 2008/2009 2009/2010 2010/2011 2011/2012
Populations—all practices
No of practices 569 566 565 556 534 499
Total list size 5 321 351 5 370 801 5 449 547 5 432 224 5 301 520 5 069 748
Patients with at least one of the 16 conditions (%) 30.1 30.0 30.1 30.0 29.8 29.3
Populations—ONS linkage
No of practices 333 336 335 332 313 289
Total list size 3 257 681 3 362 641 3 408 043 3 415 997 3 271 321 3 157 801
Patients with at least one of the 16 conditions (%) 29.5 29.3 29.3 29.1 29.0 28.4
Exceptions: clinical contraindication
Patients with one or more (%) 12.6 12.3 11.9 12.3 12.4 12.4
Patients with more than one (%) 3.7 3.8 3.4 3.3 3.2 3.2
Exceptions: informed dissent
Patients with one or more (%) 8.0 8.6 8.3 8.6 9.2 9.0
Patients with more than one (%) 1.7 2.1 2.0 1.9 2.0 2.0
Exceptions: reason unknown (general)
Patients with one or more (%) 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1
Patients with more than one (%) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Exceptions: all reasons*
Patients with one or more (%) 19.1 19.3 18.8 19.3 19.9 19.8
Patients with more than one (%) 6.1 6.5 5.9 5.8 6.0 5.8
Exceptions: clinical contraindication AND informed dissent
Patients with one or more (%) 1.6 1.7 1.6 1.6 1.7 1.6
Patients with more than one (%) 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
By region: percentage of patients with one or more exception (all reasons*)
English regions
North East 18.2 19.0 17.3 19.0 19.0 18.7
North West 19.6 19.7 19.1 19.6 20.0 19.5
Yorkshire and Humber 17.8 18.6 18.1 18.3 18.7 20.5
East Midlands 21.9 19.6 22.2 20.1 20.5 20.7
West Midlands 15.8 16.6 16.3 16.8 18.4 18.6
East England 17.8 18.7 18.3 18.8 19.3 18.6
South West 19.6 20.8 20.7 21.3 22.5 23.3
South Central 17.0 16.8 16.7 17.4 18.0 17.1
London 18.8 17.8 16.4 17.1 17.8 16.8
South East 16.9 16.4 15.4 17.0 17.6 17.1
Country aggregates
England 18.2 18.3 17.8 18.4 19.1 18.7
Northern Ireland 19.3 20.8 20.0 18.9 17.3 18.4
Scotland 22.2 21.8 22.0 23.3 24.3 25.5
Wales 23.5 24.3 22.7 22.7 23.1 22.7
By practice area deprivation quintile: percentage of patients with one or more exception (all reasons*)
1 (least deprived) 18.0 18.0 17.3 17.3 18.3 18.1
2 18.0 19.0 18.6 18.9 19.6 20.1
3 19.9 19.7 18.8 19.5 20.4 20.4
4 19.9 19.6 19.4 19.9 20.1 19.1
5 19.6 20.0 19.5 20.8 21.4 21.4
By patient area deprivation quintile: percentage of patients with one or more exception (all reasons*)†
1 (least deprived) 16.6 16.8 16.2 16.6 17.8 17.3
2 18.0 18.1 17.8 18.1 19.1 18.9
3 18.5 18.6 18.3 18.8 19.9 19.8
4 19.0 18.9 18.4 18.9 19.6 19.1
5 19.2 19.1 18.8 19.9 20.1 19.7
Continued
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was positively correlated with the number of indica-
tors in the domain, Spearman’s rho=0.73 for 2011/
2012). The highest odds of a contraindication excep-
tion was observed for patients with coronary heart
disease (OR=23.71, 99% CI 22.87 to 24.58) and the
highest informed dissent odds for patients with dia-
betes (OR=5.38, 99% CI 5.25 to 5.52), compared
with patients without each of the conditions, respect-
ively (but with one of the investigated QOF condi-
tions, in order for exceptions to be relevant). The
odds of being exception reported for a
contraindication increased with deprivation in the
area the patient lived in, with the largest difference
between the most and least affluent areas (OR=1.29,
99% CI 1.24 to 1.35). For informed dissent, however,
the biggest differences were observed between the
third and fourth quintile and the first (most affluent)
quintile. When area deprivation was measured at the
practice location, the odds of being exempted for a
contraindication were highest for the third quintile
(OR=1.84, 99% CI 1.76 to 1.92) and the odds of
being exception reported for informed dissent were
Table 1 Continued
2006/2007 2007/2008 2008/2009 2009/2010 2010/2011 2011/2012
By sex: percentage of patients with one or more exception (all reasons*)
Female 17.9 18.0 17.6 18.0 18.7 18.8
Male 20.7 20.9 20.3 21.0 21.5 21.2
By smoking status: percentage of patients with one or more exception (all reasons*)
Never 17.3 17.4 16.8 17.1 17.8 17.6
Ex-smoker 21.3 21.6 20.9 21.4 21.9 21.6
Smoker 17.8 17.4 17.1 18.0 18.7 19.1
Missing 11.2 10.5 9.8 9.8 10.2 10.0
By death in next year: percentage of patients with one or more exception (all reasons*)
Alive 18.6 18.7 18.3 18.9 19.5 .
Dead 41.8 42.0 40.5 41.0 41.4 .
By condition: percentage prevalence rates in patients with one or more exception (all reasons*)
Atrial fibrillation 40.5 42.4 41.0 41.3 41.4 40.7
Asthma 26.5 25.7 25.4 25.9 26.7 26.8
Hypertension 23.8 24.7 23.9 24.5 25.0 24.5
Cancer 19.8 20.3 19.6 19.9 20.4 19.8
Coronary heart disease 47.2 47.8 45.6 45.8 45.7 44.3
Heart failure 47.8 47.9 47.0 49.7 48.4 46.2
Chronic kidney disease 35.8 37.0 34.4 34.5 34.4 33.3
COPD 45.7 46.0 44.8 46.6 45.8 43.5
Dementia 38.5 38.8 36.8 37.5 38.3 36.7
Depression 14.3 14.1 14.0 14.9 16.0 16.5
Diabetes mellitus 36.7 38.3 36.8 38.6 38.6 36.7
Epilepsy 28.9 28.8 28.4 27.8 28.5 30.2
Learning disability 15.7 15.9 15.4 14.9 15.8 16.4
Severe mental illness 26.3 26.9 25.7 26.9 27.2 28.9
Stroke 42.0 42.1 40.1 40.1 40.6 39.1
Hypothyroidism 19.3 19.7 18.9 19.2 19.7 19.4
Means (SDs) for patients with one or more exceptions (all reasons*)
Age‡ 61.4 (20.4) 62.1 (19.9) 61.9 (19.8) 61.8 (19.6) 61.9 (19.5) 61.6 (19.3)
No of morbidities‡ 2.3 (1.4) 2.3 (1.4) 2.3 (1.4) 2.3 (1.4) 2.3 (1.4) 2.3 (1.4)
BMI§ 28.4 (6.4) 28.6 (6.6) 28.7 (6.7) 28.9 (6.8) 28.9 (6.6) 29.0 (6.7)
BMI missing (%) 50.0 51.2 50.9 50.8 50.7 50.2
Means (SDs) for patients without an exception
Age‡ 52.9 (19.7) 53.0 (19.5) 53.4 (19.5) 53.6 (19.4) 54.0 (19.2) 54.5 (19.1)
No of morbidities‡ 1.5 (0.9) 1.5 (0.9) 1.5 (0.9) 1.5 (0.9) 1.6 (0.9) 1.6 (0.9)
BMI§ 28.4 (6.4) 28.5 (6.5) 28.7 (6.6) 28.8 (6.7) 28.9 (6.6) 28.9 (6.6)
BMI missing (%) 60.6 62.7 61.3 61.2 60.6 59.5
*Clinical contraindication, informed dissent or reason unknown. Logistical exceptions were not included in analyses.
†Available for ONS linked patients only.
‡Data were complete for age and number of morbidities.
§Partially imputed using the mibmi algorithm.
BMI, body mass index; COPD, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease; ONS, Office of National Statistics.
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highest for the 5th (most deprived) quintile
(OR=1.19, 99% CI 1.15 to 1.24).
In the models where we used the number of mor-
bidities as predictor, rather than the individual condi-
tions, the number of morbidities was a very strong
predictor of both clinical contraindication and
informed dissent exemptions (see online supplemen-
tary appendix table A5). Compared with patients with
a single condition, ORs for patients with two, three
or four or more conditions were, respectively 4.28
(99% CI 4.18 to 4.38), 16.32 (99% CI 15.82 to
16.83) and 68.69 (99% CI 66.12 to 71.37) for
contraindication, and 2.68 (99% CI 2.63 to 2.74),
4.02 (99% CI 3.91 to 4.13) and 5.17 (99% CI 5.00
to 5.35) for informed dissent. Results for each QOF
year and deprivation—both at practice and patient
level—broadly agreed with models using individual
conditions. However, we observed higher exception
reporting odds for men on both contraindication
(OR=1.40, 99% CI 1.37 to 1.44) and informed
dissent exemptions (OR=1.53, 99% CI 1.49 to 1.56).
Exception reporting and survival in the following year
Findings were broadly similar across analyses of
CPRD or ONS verified deaths, so, we discuss the
results for the latter only. Patients with one or more
informed dissent codes recorded had a 20% higher
risk of death in the following year, compared with
patients who were not exception reported (HR 1.20,
99% CI 1.17 to 1.24). The risk was higher for clinical
contraindication and for patients exempted from the
whole domain (for whom a specific reason for
exemption is not available), with HRs of 1.37 (99%
CI 1.33 to 1.40) and 1.39 (99% CI 1.22 to 1.58),
respectively (table 3). Men (HR=1.28, 99% CI 1.25
to 1.31) and smokers (HR=1.61, 99% CI 1.55 to
1.66) had higher hazards of death. Area deprivation
measured at the practice location did not predict mor-
tality but deprivation at the patient location did;
patients living in the most deprived quintile of areas
had a higher risk of death (HR=1.32, 99% CI 1.27
to 1.37), compared with patients living in the most
affluent quintile of areas. Interpretation of the condi-
tion coefficients is not straightforward due to poten-
tial collinearity and the inclusion of time-varying
covariates.
In alternative models where we pooled all types of
exception reports into a single predictor, patients with
at least one exception code had a 38% higher risk of
death in the following year (HR=1.38, 99% CI 1.35
to 1.41), compared with patients without a recorded
exception report (see online supplementary appendix
table A6). Under the propensity score controlled sensi-
tivity analyses, the associations were even stronger.
The HR was 1.63 (99% CI 1.59 to 1.66) for any
exemption, 1.67 (99% CI: 1.63 to 1.71) for at least
one clinical contraindication exemption and 1.35
(99% CI 1.31 to 1.39) for at least one informed
dissent exemption.
Rates of met and unmet exemptions
Rates of ‘met’ exemptions in the diabetes domain
varied from 1.0% for treatment of microalbuminuria
(ie, 1.0% of patients with diabetes with
Figure 1 Exception reporting rates by reason for 2011/2012, the last year of the study.
*Unknown relates to global exceptions applied to the entire domain, where a specific reason for exclusion has not been recorded.
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Table 2 Predictors of exception reporting (at least one exception code within each year and patient); logistic regression analyses on ONS
linked data from 357 practices
OR (99% CI)
All reasons*† Clinical contraindication‡ Informed dissent§
QOF year
2006/2007 Reference Reference Reference
2007/2008 1.03 (1.02 to 1.05) 0.93 (0.91 to 0.95) 1.14 (1.12 to 1.16)
2008/2009 0.99 (0.97 to 1.00) 0.91 (0.90 to 0.93) 1.08 (1.06 to 1.10)
2009/2010 1.09 (1.08 to 1.11) 1.021 (1.00 to 1.04) 1.18 (1.16 to 1.21)
2010/2011 1.30 (1.28 to 1.32) 1.15 (1.12 to 1.17) 1.44 (1.41 to 1.47)
2011/2012 1.27 (1.24 to 1.29) 1.15 (1.13 to 1.18) 1.34 (1.32 to 1.37)
List size
Per 1000 increase 1.01 (1.01 to 1.01) 1.00 (0.99 to 1.00) 1.02 (1.02 to 1.03)
English region
North East Reference Reference Reference
North West 1.01 (0.95 to 1.08) 1.58 (1.45 to 1.72) 0.70 (0.65 to 0.74)
Yorkshire and The Humber 0.62 (0.58 to 0.67) 0.93 (0.85 to 1.03) 0.51 (0.47 to 0.55)
East Midlands 1.10 (1.02 to 1.19) 1.55 (1.40 to 1.72) 0.87 (0.81 to 0.95)
West Midlands 0.66 (0.62 to 0.70) 1.04 (0.95 to 1.13) 0.47 (0.44 to 0.50)
East of England 1.06 (0.99 to 1.13) 1.95 (1.79 to 2.13) 0.61 (0.57 to 0.65)
South West 1.07 (1.00 to 1.14) 1.88 (1.72 to 2.05) 0.65 (0.61 to 0.69)
South Central 0.84 (0.78 to 0.89) 1.27 (1.16 to 1.39) 0.62 (0.57 to 0.66)
London 0.64 (0.60 to 0.68) 0.94 (0.86 to 1.03) 0.52 (0.48 to 0.55)
South East Coast 0.68 (0.63 to 0.73) 0.96 (0.88 to 1.05) 0.57 (0.54 to 0.61)
Practice deprivation quintile
1 (least deprived) Reference Reference Reference
2 1.31 (1.27 to 1.36) 1.62 (1.56 to 1.69) 1.04 (1.00 to 1.07)
3 1.55 (1.50 to 1.61) 1.84 (1.76 to 1.92) 1.17 (1.13 to 1.22)
4 1.28 (1.24 to 1.33) 1.51 (1.44 to 1.57) 1.04 (1.01 to 1.08)
5 1.33 (1.28 to 1.38) 1.40 (1.34 to 1.47) 1.19 (1.15 to 1.24)
Gender
Female Reference Reference Reference
Male 1.01 (0.99 to 1.03) 0.90 (0.88 to 0.92) 1.08 (1.06 to 1.10)
Age
Per 1-year increase 1.02 (1.02 to 1.03) 1.04 (1.03 to 1.04) 1.02 (1.01 to 1.02)
Patient deprivation quintile
1 (least deprived) Reference Reference Reference
2 1.06 (1.03 to 1.09) 1.12 (1.08 to 1.16) 1.00 (0.97 to 1.03)
3 1.10 (1.07 to 1.13) 1.10 (1.06 to 1.15) 1.10 (1.06 to 1.13)
4 1.15 (1.11 to 1.19) 1.14 (1.10 to 1.19) 1.16 (1.12 to 1.20)
5 1.16 (1.12 to 1.20) 1.29 (1.24 to 1.35) 1.07 (1.03 to 1.12)
Conditions¶
Atrial fibrillation 3.11 (3.00 to 3.22) 5.33 (5.11 to 5.56) 1.06 (1.02 to 1.11)
Asthma 4.97 (4.86 to 5.09) 2.85 (2.77 to 2.93) 4.58 (4.47 to 4.69)
Hypertension 1.47 (1.44 to 1.50) 1.71 (1.67 to 1.76) 1.15 (1.13 to 1.18)
Cancer 0.96 (0.93 to 0.99) 1.18 (1.14 to 1.22) 0.80 (0.78 to 0.83)
Coronary heart disease 9.82 (9.54 to 10.11) 23.71 (22.87 to 24.58) 2.20 (2.14 to 2.27)
Heart failure 1.83 (1.74 to 1.92) 2.54 (2.40 to 2.70) 0.98 (0.93 to 1.03)
Chronic kidney disease 1.82 (1.78 to 1.87) 2.43 (2.36 to 2.51) 1.08 (1.05 to 1.11)
COPD 5.84 (5.63 to 6.07) 9.20 (8.78 to 9.64) 2.24 (2.15 to 2.33)
Dementia 2.24 (2.13 to 2.37) 3.25 (3.04 to 3.46) 1.02 (0.96 to 1.09)
Depression 0.94 (0.92 to 0.96) 1.81 (1.76 to 1.85) 0.52 (0.51 to 0.53)
Diabetes mellitus 6.35 (6.20 to 6.51) 5.06 (4.91 to 5.22) 5.38 (5.25 to 5.52)
Epilepsy 5.30 (5.01 to 5.60) 11.76 (11.00 to 12.59) 1.37 (1.29 to 1.47)
Continued
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microalbuminuria were both exempted for this indica-
tor and received treatment) to 7.1% for control of
HbA1c ≤10% (figure 2 and appendix figure A1). On
average across the whole study period, quality stan-
dards were met for 48% of exempted patients, but
this varied across indicators from 8% for the treat-
ment of microalbuminuria (ie, 8% of patients
exempted for this indicator were nevertheless treated)
to 80% for the measurement of blood pressure
(details on the indicators are provided in online sup-
plementary appendix table A3). For simple processes
such as blood pressure measurement or blood tests,
the majority of exempted patients eventually received
the incentivised care. Conversely, for more complex
processes such as retinal screening and for treatments,
only a minority received the incentivised care.
For the intermediate outcomes indicators, targets
were achieved for the majority of exempted patients,
with the exception of the indicator relating to tight
glycaemic control (HbA1c ≤7.0/7.5%), for which
only 29% of exceptions were met, compared with
60% for moderate glycaemic control (HbA1c ≤9.0/
10.0%). Since the intermediate outcome indicators
cannot be met without first meeting the respective
process indicator (eg, the patient automatically fails
the blood pressure control indicator if blood pressure
is not measured), a proportion of patients who are
eventually measured will therefore meet the inter-
mediate outcome indicator without the practice chan-
ging their treatment.
DISCUSSION
Tailoring population-based guidelines to the needs and
preferences of individual patients can be challenging,
both for designers of guidelines and for clinicians
applying them in practice. This challenge is further
complicated in the context of pay-for-performance
programmes: when clinicians are financially incenti-
vised to apply guidelines, the risk of inappropriate
care increases. The provision for practices to excep-
tion report patients under the UK’s QOF is intended
to obviate this risk and ensure shared decision making
in the consultation process,32–34 at a relatively low
cost.14 However, it may in turn result in patients who
would benefit from inclusion in the quality scheme
being inappropriately excluded. National guidance on
exception reporting states that exempted patients
should ‘still be the recipients of best clinical care and
practice’.23 We found that quality standards are subse-
quently met for almost half of exempted patients. We
also found that certain patient groups are more likely
to be exempted, and that exempted patients have
poorer outcomes. However, patients who are already
in poor health are more likely to be exempted or to
refuse treatments, and the complex relationships
between exception reporting, health status and patient
outcomes will require further investigation.
Limitations
First, this is an analysis of observational data and it is
difficult to demonstrate causality, or even directional-
ity in some cases. For example, while non-provision
of recommended care may lead to poorer health out-
comes and increase the risk of mortality, patients who
are already in very poor health may also be more
likely to refuse treatment and investigations. Even so,
the relationship between informed dissent and mortal-
ity persisted after controlling for morbidities and
other types of exceptions. Second, although our mod-
elling approach attempted to replicate as closely as
possible the processes by which exceptions are applied
by practices, we cannot directly compare rates
reported under the national QOF scheme and those
we calculated using CPRD data. We used more inclu-
sive code lists than what are used under the QOF
rules, to better account for changes in recording prac-
tice and in the rules themselves over time.7 27 Levels
of exception reporting also varied across geographical
areas. Although our CPRD sample was broadly
nationally representative, some regions were over-
represented and others were under-represented.27
Third, CPRD collects data from practices that use a
single computer system (Vision) and differences in
recording routines might exist across clinical computer
systems.24 Fourth, reasons for exception reporting are
not mutually exclusive, and we cannot assume that
Table 2 Continued
OR (99% CI)
All reasons*† Clinical contraindication‡ Informed dissent§
Learning disability 1.10 (1.00 to 1.22) 1.75 (1.54 to 1.99) 0.66 (0.58 to 0.75)
Severe mental illness 4.38 (4.17 to 4.60) 4.42 (4.15 to 4.70) 2.83 (2.68 to 2.98)
Stroke 3.61 (3.48 to 3.73) 3.84 (3.68 to 4.01) 2.44 (2.35 to 2.53)
Hypothyroidism 0.87 (0.84 to 0.90) 0.93 (0.89 to 0.96) 0.84 (0.81 to 0.87)
*Clinical contraindication, informed dissent or reason unknown. Logistical exceptions were not included in analyses.
†No of observations=5 787 456, No of subjects=1 414 897, Log likelihood=−1 869 483, Wald χ2=224 393.
‡No of observations=5 787 456, No of subjects=1 414 897, Log likelihood=−1 211 443, Wald χ2=223 723.
§No of observations=5 787 456, No of subjects=1 414 897, Log likelihood=−1 249 265, Wald χ2=87 458.
¶Reference: patients without the specific condition, but with one or more other study conditions.
COPD, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease; ONS, Office of National Statistics; QOF, Quality and Outcomes Framework.
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patients giving informed dissent do not also have a
contraindication, although a practice would not need
to obtain a reason for dissent if a contraindication was
recorded. Fifth, analyses of primary care databases
rest on the assumption that GPs accurately record con-
sultations in their clinical computer systems, and for
the purposes of this study that, for example, informed
dissent exemptions are recorded as such. Although we
cannot be certain this is the case, the very low usage
of generic codes is an indication that practices have
sought to record the reason for exception reporting.
Sixth, overall mortality may not be a sensitive enough
measure and cause-specific mortality for each condi-
tion of interest linked to exceptions from specific rele-
vant indicators, although answering a slightly
different research question, could potentially provide
a more informative clinical picture. Finally, although
we used all QOF conditions to define our cohort
(which include all major conditions), most conditions
are not included in QOF and our analyses therefore
investigate the relationship between QOF-specific
multimorbidity and outcomes.
Findings
The likelihood of being exception reported under the
pay-for-performance scheme varied with patient
characteristics. In the regression models, older people,
women and patients in less affluent areas were more
likely to be exception reported for a clinical contra-
indication. This broadly agrees with previous findings
for patients with diabetes in North West London.21
Patterns were similar for informed dissent, but men
were more likely to be exception reported than
women. The higher overall raw rates of exception
reporting in men are largely attributable to higher
prevalence of conditions such as coronary heart
disease and diabetes.35 36 Patients with these condi-
tions were more likely to have one or more exception
reports, as were patients with chronic obstructive pul-
monary disease or epilepsy. The probability of being
exempted increased sharply with the number of
chronic conditions: compared with patients with a
single condition, patients with two conditions were
four times more likely to be exempted for a contra-
indication and patients with four or more conditions
were almost 70 times more likely. This finding was
expected, as the presence of a supervening condition
or extreme frailty are the criteria for exemption.
However, we also found that multimorbid patients
were more likely to refuse monitoring and treatment
under the scheme. This raises questions about the
appropriateness of incentive frameworks and guide-
lines based on single conditions.37
Greater area deprivation was also associated with
higher exception rates. In our results, this is mainly
driven by clinical contraindication exemptions and to
a smaller extent by refusal of treatment. It seems
Table 3 Exception reporting, by reason,* as a predictor of
survival in the subsequent year; proportional-hazards survival
analyses on ONS linked data from 357 practices
HR (95% CI)†
Exception reported‡
Clinical contraindication 1.37 (1.33 to 1.40)
Informed dissent 1.20 (1.17 to 1.24)
Unknown reason 1.39 (1.22 to 1.58)
Age§ 1.07 (1.05 to 1.09)
Gender
Female Reference
Male 1.28 (1.25 to 1.31)
Smoking status
Never smoked Reference
Ex-smoker 0.97 (0.95 to 0.995)
Current smoker 1.61 (1.55 to 1.66)
Missing§ 8.71 (1.23 to 61.63)
Patient deprivation quintile
1 (least deprived) Reference
2 1.06 (1.03 to 1.10)
3 1.12 (1.09 to 1.16)
4 1.20 (1.17 to 1.25)
5 1.32 (1.27 to 1.37)
Practice list size (1000 s) 1.000 (0.999 to 1.002)
Practice deprivation quintile
1 (least deprived) Reference
2 0.99 (0.96 to 1.02)
3 0.98 (0.94 to 1.01)
4 0.99 (0.95 to 1.02)
5 1.03 (0.99 to 1.07)
Conditions
Atrial fibrillation 1.32 (1.29 to 1.36)
Asthma 0.91 (0.88 to 0.94)
Hypertension 0.90 (0.88 to 0.92)
Cancer§ 1.60 (1.11 to 2.31)
Coronary heart disease 0.97 (0.95 to 0.997)
Heart failure 1.68 (1.62 to 1.73)
Chronic kidney disease§ 1.60 (1.13 to 2.27)
Chronic obstructive pulmonary disease 1.72 (1.67 to 1.77)
Dementia§ 3.07 (1.85 to 5.11)
Depression 1.06 (1.03 to 1.08)
Diabetes mellitus§ 1.39 (0.94 to 2.06)
Epilepsy 1.68 (1.58 to 1.80)
Learning disability§ 8.85 (0.33 to 234.09)
Severe mental illness 1.43 (1.35 to 1.51)
Stroke 1.32 (1.29 to 1.36)
Hypothyroidism 0.99 (0.96 to 1.02)
Time-varying (× log(_t))
Age 1.01 (1.00 to 1.01)
Smoking status: missing 0.34 (0.13 to 0.88)
Cancer 1.21 (1.01 to 1.43)
Chronic kidney disease 0.87 (0.74 to 1.03)
Dementia 0.89 (0.70 to 1.14)
Diabetes mellitus 0.94 (0.78 to 1.13)
Learning disability 0.53 (0.11 to 2.67)
Based on ONS deaths. Number of observations / time at risk=4416374, Number of
subjects=1194389 (excluding data for 2011/12 since survival information for the following year
was not available), Number of failures=68756, Log pseudolikelihood=−869469, Wald
Chi2=120783.
*Clinical contraindication, informed dissent or reason unknown. Logistical exceptions were not
included in analyses.
†Based on ONS deaths. No of observations/time at risk=4 416 374, No of subjects=1 194 389, No
of failures=68 756, Log pseudolikelihood=−869 469, Wald χ2=120 783.
‡At least one code within each category.
§Interpretation of the HRs for these covariates is not straightforward because of the inclusion of the
time-varying components.
ONS, Office of National Statistics.
Original research
666 Kontopantelis E, et al. BMJ Qual Saf 2016;25:657–670. doi:10.1136/bmjqs-2015-004602
likely that the poorer health of patients residing in
more deprived areas leads to more contraindication
exceptions, although refusal is also a factor, possibly
driven by health experiences, education or other
aspects of deprivation that are captured in the index
of multiple deprivation. However, we observed a
stronger (and a non-linear) relationship between
exception reporting and area deprivation measured at
the practice location than at the patient location, espe-
cially for contraindications, with the highest rates
observed for the middle deprivation quintile. This
suggests that exception reporting usage varies with
practice location deprivation, above what would be
expected from the average deprivation of the practice
population. A possible explanation for the non-linear
nature of the effect is that patients are more likely to
be undiagnosed in the most deprived practices, and
hence less likely to be exception reported due to
contraindication. Alternatively, practices in the most
deprived areas might be performing well in terms of
case finding, but might not use contraindication
exception reports as much as practices in more afflu-
ent areas. In either case, it is possible that recording
of exceptions is less complete in practices located in
the most deprived areas.
With respect to mortality, we observed several well-
known relationships: men, smokers, patients residing
in more deprived areas and multimorbid patients had a
higher probability of dying. Controlling for these
factors, we found that patients receiving one or more
exception codes, of any type, were more likely to die
the following year. Compared with patients with no
exceptions, mortality rates were the highest for contra-
indication exceptions (≈37% higher) and also signifi-
cantly higher for informed dissent exceptions (≈20%
higher). For contraindication exception reporting, we
can reasonably assume that the relationship with mor-
tality is confounded by multimorbidity and overall
health: less healthy patients are more likely to have a
contraindication, intolerance or terminal illness.
Similar confounding is also likely to occur for
informed dissent, but the strength of the confounding
is likely to be weaker (multimorbidity, a reasonable
proxy for overall health, was a weaker predictor of
informed dissent than of contraindications). However,
in the survival analyses we controlled for all major con-
ditions and also used propensity scores as an alternative
way to control for confounders of the effect of
informed dissent on mortality and the effect persisted.
Although there is a risk of unmeasured confounding
Figure 2 Exception reporting rates in the diabetes domain of the Quality and Outcomes Framework (QOF), aggregated over time.
*Details on the indicators are provided in online supplementary appendix table A3. †DM9 changes significantly in 2011/2012 so
calculations for that indicator are limited to 2006/2007–2010/2011. ‡Patients with documented proteinuria are exempted for
indicator DM13.
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(eg, multimorbidity not captured by the QOF condi-
tions), it does appear that refusal of QOF investigations
and treatments is linked to poorer outcomes. However,
previous investigations have questioned the effective-
ness of some QOF indicators36 and have failed to iden-
tify a link between performance on QOF indicators
and mortality.12 Therefore, although informed dissent
under the QOF might have no direct effect on survival,
it might be a proxy for non-adherence with the advice
and recommendations of health professionals gener-
ally, or of other risk-prone or unhealthy behaviours.38
Informed dissent potentially identifies a group of
patients for whom it would be appropriate to design
and evaluate more tailored interventions to optimise
care according to their preferences.
Finally, within the diabetes indicator set, we saw
that the levels of ‘met’ exception reporting are not
negligible and are high for some indicators, indicating
that the exception reporting provision is used more
often than previously reported under the QOF
scheme. For example, for indicators relating to blood
pressure measurement and control, ‘met’ exemption
rates were higher than the ‘unmet’ rates reported
under the QOF. This finding is in agreement with pre-
vious work that reported high met exemption rates
for influenza immunisation.27 The high observed met
exception reporting rates for most indicators suggests
that health professionals are often successful in deli-
vering incentivised care to patients who were initially
exempted, whether for reasons of contraindication or
informed dissent. This appears to be more likely to
occur for more straightforward measurement activities
(eg, blood pressure measurement), which are easier to
deliver if the patient attends for routine care, com-
pared with more complex activities and interventions
(eg, diabetic eye screening). Similarly, there were more
met exceptions for the less challenging of the two gly-
caemic control targets.
CONCLUSIONS
Older, male, more multimorbid and more socio-
economically deprived patients are more likely to be
exempted from the UK’s QOF. Furthermore, patients
who are exception reported are more likely to die in
the following year, whether they were exempted by the
practice for a contraindication or by themselves
through informed dissent. In most cases, this may be
entirely appropriate, as an exemption will often be an
indication of the practice recognising the limitations
imposed by existing poor health or respecting the
wishes of frail patients in a shared decision-making
process.14 34 It appears that the exception reporting
provisions in the scheme are generally being used prop-
erly by practices to tailor national guidelines to individ-
ual patients’ circumstances and preferences.39
However, the greater use of exception reporting in par-
ticular patient groups raises questions about whether
the QOF is contributing to healthcare inequalities,
with practices serving such patients using exception
reporting, legitimately or otherwise, in response to dif-
ficulties in engaging patients who are less able or
willing to attend routine chronic disease clinics.20 The
QOF payment system makes no allowance for differ-
ences in the work required to deliver care to different
patient groups. Similarly, the association between
informed dissent exception reporting and higher mor-
tality again highlights that there may be opportunities
for more tailored approaches for groups of patients for
whom the one-size-fits-all approach of QOF sits
uncomfortably. There are lessons here for designers of
other incentive schemes, who must balance the require-
ment for consistent targets with the need to include
mechanisms that allow for the exercise of discretion by
clinicians and autonomy by patients. Further explora-
tions of the relationships between the exact reasons for
exception reporting and cause-specific mortality are
needed to ensure that patients are receiving the
optimum benefit from incentivisation interventions.
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